Abstract-Intra-session network coding is known to be vulnerable to Byzantine attacks: malicious nodes can inject bogus packets, which get combined with legitimate blocks at downstream nodes, thus preventing decoding of original packets and degrading the overall performance. In this paper, we provide a novel approach that can identify the precise location of all Byzantine attackers in systems with intra-session network coding. A key ingredient of our approach is a novel homomorphic MAC scheme for expanding subspaces (SpaceMac) that allows to eliminate any uncertainty in identifying attackers via subspace properties. To the best of our knowledge, our scheme is the first that can identify precisely all Byzantine attackers, and at the same time, has both low computation (sub-millisecond) and communication overhead (20 bytes per data block). Simulation results show that even when there are multiple colluding attackers in a network, all of them can be successfully identified in a very short time.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we are interested in content distribution systems, such as [3] or [15] , that employ random network coding 1 to increase throughput and facilitate distributed scheduling. However, network coding is also inherently vulnerable to Byzantine (a.k.a. pollution) attacks: a malicious node can inject corrupted packets to its outgoing links, which then get combined with legitimate packets in downstream nodes, to prevent decoding of the original data and eventually degrade the overall performance. The effect of a single corrupted packet is amplified due to mixing with other packets.
The severity of pollution attacks in systems with network coding has generated a significant amount of work in this area. Proposed defense mechanisms can be classified into three categories: error correction, attack detection, and attacker identification. First, error-correcting mechanisms, such as, [8] , [11] , deal with the problem end-to-end: they utilize redundancy at the source to correct corrupted packets at the receivers. Second, attack detection mechanisms can be used at intermediate nodes and aim at detecting whether a linear combination is legitimate or corrupted; detected corrupted packets are dropped so they do not further pollute the system. Work in this area includes both information theoretic [5] and cryptographic approaches; the latter leverage null keys [10] , homomorphic hashes [4] , signatures [1] , or message authentication codes (MACs) [2] . Third, there is also work that aims at identifying the nodes where Byzantine attackers are located, either approximately via subspace properties [7] or exactly using a non-repudiation protocol [16] .
In this paper, we are interested in the third problem: our goal is to design a system that can accurately identify the location of all Byzantine attackers. This allows to remove the attackers from the system and stop the pollution attack at its root -without wasting network resources on handling corrupted traffic. To the best of our knowledge, none of the existing solutions to this problem possesses all the following desired properties: (1) Can exactly identify all pollution attackers. In this paper, we introduce a novel scheme that meets all the above three requirements. Our scheme builds on and extends the work of Jafarisiavoshani et al. [7] , which exploits subspace properties to approximately identify the location of attackers. To eliminate the uncertainty in identifying pollution attackers via subspace properties, we design a novel homomorphic MAC scheme for expanding subspaces that enforces nodes to report their true incoming subspaces. Our homomorphic MAC scheme is inspired by the scheme by Agrawal and Boneh [1] and has equivalent low computation overhead. However, unlike [1] , our scheme allows intermediate nodes to sign subspaces that expand over time, as opposed to [1] , which allows for signing a fixed space. In addition, to prevent malicious nodes from denying their behaviors and disparaging benign nodes, we incorporate the light-weight non-repudiation transmission protocol by Wang et al. [16] , which has significantly less communication overhead than most existing schemes. Finally, by leveraging multiple generations, our scheme is the first that can identify all pollution attackers even when there is a large number of colluding attackers. To support the identification process, our scheme requires a reliable low-bandwidth channel between a controller and each node.
We evaluate our scheme via simulation in networks with 52 nodes and up to 18 attackers, some of which are colluding, and demonstrate that we can rapidly identify the location of all attackers. The contributions of this paper lie in the design of (i) the novel homomorphic MAC scheme for expanding subspaces, SpaceMac, in Section IV, and (ii) the overall system described in Section V that combines several components so as to be able to accurately locate all attackers.
II. RELATED WORK We review here work directly relevant to the problem of attacker location identification we study in this paper. Due to space constraints, we refer the reader to [12] for a detailed review of error-correction and attack detection schemes.
In [7] , Jafarisiavoshani et al. observe that vectors sent from a node belong to the space spanned by the vectors sent by the source and also the space spanned by the vectors the node receives. Using this observation, in a general network topology 978-1-4244-71 -/10/$26.00 ©2010 IEEE Fig. 1 . An example of inferring an attacker's location using information about polluted edges from [7] . The attacker is at node B. Scenarios (1) and (2) correspond to the sets of polluted edges when the attacker lies and is honest about its incoming subspace, respectively. The controller can narrow down the attacker to two nodes: A and B, as they initiate polluted edges.
having a single attacker, the attacker can be located with an uncertainty of at most two nodes. When there are multiple attackers, the uncertainty is within a set of nodes including the attackers and their parents and children. Our scheme builds on and extends this work: we make it possible to pinpoint the exact location of the attackers, even in the case when there are multiple colluding attackers.
Wang et al. [16] introduce a light-weight non-repudiation protocol to identify malicious nodes. Their protocol ensures that a malicious node that injected a polluted vector cannot deny its behavior and cannot disparage any innocent node. However, using the approach in [16] , the identification requires the distribution of multiple checksums of all source vectors to all the nodes for every generation that experiences pollution attack. This incurs a significant communication overhead. Moreover, this approach is unable to identify all attackers. In contrast, our scheme can identify all attackers rapidly without the need of checksums.
A key ingredient of our solution is the design of a novel homomorphic MAC scheme (SpaceMac) that allows intermediate nodes to sign their own -expanding over timesubspaces, and thus become accountable for the packets they send, which is necessary to identify malicious nodes. This is different from the homomorphic MAC scheme by Agrawal and Boneh [1] , which allows for signing only fixed subspaces. A detailed comparison is provided in Section IV-B.
Independently and at the same time as our paper, a similar homomorphic MAC construction has been proposed for a different problem [13] . In particular, the inner-product MAC scheme was introduced in [13] to facilitate nested authentications, prevent tag pollution attacks, and support Byzantine attack detection. We propose SpaceMac for authenticating expanding subspaces and identifying the location of attackers.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION A. Network Operation
Consider a directed-acyclic-graph (DAG) network that employs linear network coding. When sending a message, a source node S first breaks the message into m vectors, 
to denote the space spanned by the vectors received by node i from node j up to time t. When there is no ambiguity, we omit the time index t.
When all the intermediate nodes are benign, the spaces Π (j) i 's are subspaces of Π S . Assume that there is a pollution attacker in the network. The attacker combines a subspace Π E with its incoming space and sends the resulting vectors to its children; thus, these children' incoming spaces are not subspaces of Π S . Formally, for every node i, its incoming space Π (j) i from its parent j can be decomposed as follows:
where ⊕ denotes the direct sum of spaces, Π
is the rest, which are vectors not belonging to Π S . We define a polluted directed edge as follows: Definition 1. A directed edge is polluted if it transmits any vector which is not a linear combination of v i 's.
The below lemma is a direct consequence of the definition: Lemma 1. The following statements are equivalent:
Jafarisiavoshani et al. [7] have shown that when there is a single pollution attacker, its location can be narrowed down to a set of at most two nodes. This is by analyzing the polluted edges identified based on the incoming subspaces reported by all the nodes to a central controller. An example is shown in Fig. 1 . However, when there are multiple attackers in a general network topology, the number of suspected nodes increases.
We observe that the uncertainty about the location of the attackers originates from the fact that the attackers can lie about their incoming spaces. Consequently, by ensuring that all nodes in the network cannot lie about their received spaces, we can exactly locate the attackers. For example, if the attacker cannot lie in the example given in Fig. 1 , then the only possible scenario is scenario (2). Thus, one can determine that the attacker is at node B.
IV. HOMOMORPHIC MAC FOR EXPANDING SUBSPACES
In order to enforce nodes to report their true incoming spaces, we require that when a node reports a space of one of its parents, it has to report a MAC tag (or simply tag) of the space as well. The tag is generated based on the secret key shared by the parent and the controller. Since an attacker does not know its parent's secret key, it cannot generate a valid tag for a space not from the parent. We note that from the perspective of an intermediate node i, the subspace Π (j) i it receives from a parent node j potentially expands when it receives more vectors from node j. As a result, the tag of the space Π (j) i dynamically changes over time.
A. Subspace Properties
The following lemma shows for each subspace Π (j) i , node i may report a randomly chosen vector, y r , of the space instead of the space itself; and by checking if y r ∈ Π S , the controller can determine if Π (j) i ⊆ Π S to identify the polluted edges.
Lemma 2 (Jafarisiavoshani et al. [6] , [7] ). Let Π 1 and Π 2 be two subspaces of F n+m q and assume that y r is a randomly selected vector from Π 1 . Then, for q 1, y r ∈ Π 2 if and only if Π 1 ⊆ Π 2 .
B. Homomorphic MAC Scheme (SpaceMac)
To allow a child node to generate a valid tag for a randomly chosen vector, y r , of the parent's space, for every vector, y, that the parent sends to the child, the parent also sends a tag of y. The tag is computed based on a homomorphic MAC scheme so that the child can combine its received tags to calculate a valid tag for y r .
Recently, Agrawal and Boneh [1] introduced an elegant homomorphic MAC scheme for network coding. However, this scheme requires the sending node to know in advance all the basis vectors of the space it is sending so that it can sign them (i.e., generating tags for the basis vectors.) This is required because the tag for a random vector in the space is generated based on the tags of the basis vectors. In other words, the scheme in [1] requires that the sending space is fixed in advance; as such, it is not applicable here because the space spanned by vectors y's is not fixed but rather continuously expands. We now describe the construction of our homomorphic MAC scheme, called SpaceMac, which is customized to support expanding spaces.
1) Constructions: Let K and I denote the domains of the keys and the id's of the spaces sent by the source, respectively.
• Mac(k, id, y):
-Input: a secret key k, the identifier id of the vector space Π S sent by the source, and a vector y ∈ F n+m q . -Output: tag t for y, where t is computed as follows:
-Input: a key k, the identifier id of Π S , a vector z ∈ F n+m q , and its tag t -Output: 0 (reject) or 1 (accept) as follows:
Compared to the homomorphic MAC scheme in [1] , our scheme replaces the Sign algorithm, which signs a fixed vector space, i.e., generates tags for all bases of the fixed space, with the Mac algorithm, which generates tags for any vectors in F n+m q . The Combine and Verify algorithms show that tags generated by our Mac algorithm can be combined naturally to produce a valid tag for an arbitrary linear combination.
2) Attack
• Setup. C generates a random key k R ← K • Queries. A adaptively queries C, where each query is of the form (id, y). For each query, C replies to A with the corresponding tag t ← Mac(k, id, y).
• Output. A eventually outputs a tuple (id * , y * , t * ).
Up to the time A outputs, it has queried C multiple times. Let l denote the number of times A queried C using id * and get tags for l vectors, y * 1 , · · · , y * l , of these queries. We consider that the adversary wins the security game if and only if (i) y * = 0 (trivial forge otherwise), (ii) Verify(k, id * , y * , t * ) = 1, and Proof: See the Appendix. Theorem 1 implies that an adversary A can break the scheme with probability 1 q . To improve the security, one could either increase the field size or use multiple tags. The security of our scheme using l tags is (
C. Non-repudiation Transmission Protocol
SpaceMac forces the attacker to report only true spaces received from its parents since it is computationally difficult (to forge a valid tag) otherwise; however, it does not prevent a malicious node from sending invalid tags to its children to prevent the children from reporting the polluted spaces.
For example, an attacker j can send a polluted vector y e / ∈ Π S and a bogus tag t e Mac(k j , id, y e ), to its child i. When i reports the space Π (j) i , if the randomly chosen vector y r was formed by a linear combination involving y e , then the aggregated tag t r of y r that i generates using the algorithm Combine will be very likely invalid because of the bogus tag t e . As a result, the controller will reject y r . Consequently, the attacker j successfully prevents its benign child i from reporting the polluted space Π (j) i . To address this, we utilize an efficient non-repudiation transmission protocol proposed by Wang et al. [16] : For a parent j and a child i, the controller generates a pool of secret keys S based on the private key k j of the parent and the ID i of the child. After that, the controller randomly selects a set of keys P from S based on the private k i of the child and the ID j of the parent; then, it sends P to the child. We denote S \ P as P; also, let λ def = |S| and δ def = |P|. When sending a vector, j is required to generates λ tags instead of one, using the algorithm Mac and all keys in S. When receiving a vector, i uses its set of keys P and the algorithm Verify to verify δ out of λ tags. Finally, when receiving a randomly chosen vector y r representing Π (j) i and its λ tags from the child, the controller uses all keys in P and the algorithm Verify to verify all λ − δ tags. The controller, in this case, keeps track of a counter θ, θ ≤ λ − δ. If at least θ tags pass the verification then the controller accepts the report.
We describe below the two theorems (based on theorems in [16] ) that provide the security of the non-repudiation transmission protocol when applying to our context. Theorem 2 (Non-repudiation of the receiver-Wang et al. [16] ). The probability that a malicious child node can successfully report to the controller that its parent sends it a vector y, which is never sent by the parent, is at most
Theorem 3 (Non-repudiation of the sender-Wang et al. [16] ). The probability that a malicious parent can make the controller reject the parent's space reported by one of its children by sending the child some vectors with invalid tags is at most
Because of the space constraint, we refer the readers to our technical report [12] for full proofs of both theorems. Finally, we remark that both probabilities above can be made very small by choosing the appropriate values for q, λ, δ, and θ.
V. FULL DESCRIPTION OF OUR PROPOSED SCHEME We assume that there is a controller who knows the complete topology and the source space Π s ; each node knows the identifiers of its adjacent nodes; both the source and the receivers are trusted; and there is a reliable low-bandwidth end-to-end communication path between the controller and each node. Let (pk, sk) and (pk j , sk j ) be the public and secret key pairs of the controller and node j, respectively. We assume that each node has an authentic copy of pk, and the controller has authentic copies of pk j 's. Let Enc k denote symmetric-key encryption using key k.
1. Initialization. Every node j sends k j to the controller using a key transport protocol which provides strong authentication, such as, the X.509 protocol [14] . Let I j be the set of IDs of adjacent downstream nodes of j. For i ∈ I j , the controller generates a set S ji of λ keys using a PRF
where K is the domain of key k j , and I is the domain of the identifiers of the nodes:
For i ∈ I j , consider an array L whose elements are distinct subsets of size δ of S ji . Note that L has length λ δ . The controller uses another PRF F 2 :
, where t ← F 2 (k i , j). The controller sends Enc ki (P ji ) to node i. Denote S ji \P ji as P ji .
2. Sending and Receiving. Let id be the identifier of the current source space Π s . When a node j sends a vector y to its downstream node i, beside the id, it has to send along λ tags, which are computed using the Mac algorithm and keys in S ji . Let T ji (y) denote this set of tags. Node j sends (id, y, T ji (y)). When node i receives (id, y, T ji (y)) from node j, it uses P ji and the Verify algorithm to check the validity of δ out of λ tags of T ji . It drops y as long as there is an invalid tag. Otherwise, it stores the received tuple in its buffer.
3. Pollution Detection and Alert. One way to detect pollution at the receivers is to implement the homomorphic MAC scheme proposed in [1] , where, in this case, only the source and the receivers share the same MAC key. A receiver, upon detecting a pollution, sends an alert (id, r, t) to the controller, where id is the identifier of the source space; r is the receiver ID; and t is a tag computed for (id, r) using a traditional MAC, e.g., HMAC, with key k r . When the controller receives an alert, it first verifies the tag t and drops the alert if t is invalid. Then, it determines if id is reported before, if so, it ignores the alert. Otherwise, it sends a request (id, t j ) to each node j, which demands each node to report its incoming subspace, where id is the identifier of the source space, and t j is the tag computed for id using a HMAC with key k j .
4. Reporting Subspaces. Upon receiving the request (id, t i ) from the controller, each node i verifies t i using k i and drops the request if t i is invalid. Otherwise, let (y 1 , t 1,1 , · · · , t 1,λ ), · · · , (y l , t l,1 , · · · , t l,λ ) be vectors of source space id and their tags that node i received from node j. For each parent node j of i, node i sends (i, j, y r , t 1 , · · · , t λ , t) to the controller, where
; and t is a tag of (i, j, y r , t 1 , · · · , t λ ) computed using a HMAC with key k i .
5. Identifying the Attackers. After sending out the requests, the controller waits for the reports. After ∆t seconds, it starts identifying the pollution attackers. First, it drops reports that have invalid HMAC tags. Then, it classifies any node that does not report all of its incoming spaces as a malicious node. Subsequently, it accepts reports with at least θ valid SpaceMac tags, where the validation uses keys in P ji 's. Then, it identifies the polluted edges in the network based on the reported spaces and the source space. We note that checking if a reported space is polluted can be done quickly and efficiently in O(n) in terms of multiplication operations by leveraging the global coding coefficients of the reported vector and the basis vectors of the source space. Finally, any node that does not have a polluted incoming edge but has a polluted outgoing edge is classified as malicious.
6. Releasing the Result. After identifying the set of attackers A, the controller sends (A, t i ) to each benign node i, where t i is a tag computed for A using HMAC with key k i . Upon receiving the tuple (A, t i ), each node i in the network verifies t i using k i , then if valid, it adds nodes in A into its blacklist. Every node in the network will neither send nor receive traffic from nodes in its blacklist in subsequent communication.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
1. Single Adversary. We consider two different cases, where an attacker injects erroneous vectors into one or more than one of its downstream links. Jafarisiavoshani et al. [7] have shown that in a general network, the location of the adversary can be narrowed down up to a set of at most two nodes in both cases by partitioning the edges into two set: the set of polluted edges, E p , and non-polluted edges, E s , then analyzing the nodes with respect to the identified E p and E s . They also note that the partitioning of E p and E s is not unique since the adversary might lie. Using our scheme, the probability that the attacker lies about its incoming spaces is very small (theorem 2.) Furthermore, the probability that the attacker can prevent its children from reporting the subspaces polluted by itself is very small, too (theorem 3.) As a result, with high probability (depending on q, λ, δ, and θ), our scheme can produce an unambiguous partitioning of E p and E s , which helps to uniquely identify the attacker.
2. Multiple Adversaries. In the presence of multiple adversaries, an attacker might be "in the shadow" of some other attackers, which means that it might pollute only already polluted data and thus does not produce any detectable effect.
Definition 3. An attacker is shadowed if it has at least one polluted incoming edge and is exposed otherwise. a) Independent Adversaries. In this case, we note that with high probability, our approach is already able to identify all exposed attackers. We utilize the following observation to identify all shadowed and exposed attackers.
Lemma 3. For any directed acyclic graph with pollution attack in presence, there is at least one exposed attacker.
Proof: Consider a topological ordering of the graph, the first malicious node in the ordering is an exposed attacker.
Exploiting this, we can use multiple generations, i.e., transmissions of (different) source spaces, to identify all attackers.
Lemma 4. In a network with M independent attackers. With high probability (depending on q, λ, δ, and θ), all attackers can be identified after N generations which experience pollution attack, where N ≤ M . b) Colluding Adversaries. We note that each pair of parent j and child i uses distinct key sets S ji and P ji ; thus, the collusion of malicious nodes does not provide knowledge about the key sets of benign nodes. However, when the distance between any two attackers equals to one, where distance refers to the length of the shortest path connecting two nodes, these attackers can collude to report a false space.
Assume that in a network, there are colluding attackers j and i connected by a directed edge e(j, i) and there is no other pair of attackers in the network having distance one. We ask the question: "What can j and i achieve by manipulating edge e(j, i)?" Consider a topological ordering O of the nodes. If i makes e(j, i) ∈ E p then j is exposed and identified after all malicious nodes that come before j in O are identified. After j is identified, i and the rest of the attackers will be eventually identified. Otherwise, if i makes e(j, i) ∈ E s then i is exposed and identified after all malicious nodes that come before i in O are identified. Analogous to the other case, after i is identified, j (if not already identified) and the rest of the attackers will be eventually identified. Consequently, by manipulating the status of edge e(j, i), the attackers can, at best, change the order in which j and i are identified. The above analysis can be extended to the general case where there are multiple pairs having distances one by considering the pair (j, i), where i has a polluted outgoing edge, that appears first in O first. Fig.  2 shows an example. As a result, we can generalize lemma 4: Lemma 5. In a network with M attackers. With high probability (depending on q, λ, δ, and θ), all attackers can be identified after N generations which experience pollution attack, where N ≤ M .
VII. EVALUATION
1. Colluding Adversaries. We generate between a pair of source and receiver nodes a random network of 50 nodes. The ratio of edges to nodes is a random number in [1, 5] . All edges have a random propagation delay between 10 and 100 ms. In a single generation, 5 augmented vectors in F 1024 2 8 are generated and sent by the source node. The attackers in the network are chosen randomly from the population of the 50 network nodes in a way that the removal of them does not disconnect the receiver from the sender, and each attacker can still pollute when the rest attackers are removed. The attackers pollute all of their outgoing edges. When asked by the controller, most of them honestly report their incoming subspaces; however, some of them, whose have malicious parents, lie about their received subspaces from those parents. We evaluate the average number of generations to identify all M attackers in the network, where M varies from 4 to 20. For each M , we perform the simulation for 100 rounds to get the average value. We also evaluate the average delay it takes to identify all attackers, where the delay refers to the time between when the source starts sending and when all the attackers are identified. The results shown in table I indicate that we succeed in identifying all attackers after much smaller than M generations.
2. Computation Overhead. The main computation overhead is attributed to the operations Mac, Combine, and Verify performed at each intermediate node. As discussed in [1] , one can achieve low computation overhead by implementing multiplication using offline table look-up, addition using simple XOR, and PRFs using AES from OpenSSL. Table II shows the estimated computational delays based on results from [1] . We note that for each new generation, the first Mac and Verify operations introduce larger delays (as shown in table II) because they have to use PRFs; however, results of the PRF calls can be precomputed (if id's are known) as well as cached to use for the whole generation, which makes their subsequent delays as small as Combine's.
3. Communication Overhead. The major communication overhead of our scheme comes from the tags accompanying each data block. Table III shows that with an overhead of about 20 bytes per data block, the probability that a malicious parent succeeds in preventing its child to report, Pr [j] , and the probability that a malicious child succeeds in disparaging its VIII. CONCLUSION In this study, we proposed a defense scheme to combat pollution attacks for intra-session network coding. Our scheme can identify and eliminate all attackers. The key element of our approach is the novel homomorphic MAC scheme for expanding subspaces (SpaceMac) that we utilized together with subspace properties to allow the exact identification of all attackers, even when a large number of them collude. Moreover, our scheme has both low computation and communication overhead. The simulation results show that when there are multiple colluding attackers, all of them can be successfully identified in a very short time.
